This was the title of the English-language international conference organized by the John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics on May 21, held in the Zrínyi Hall of the Ludovika University of Public Service. The event was opened by its moderator, Gábor Csizmazia, Research Fellow at the John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics, followed by welcoming remarks from Pier Paolo Pigozzi, Vice-Rector for International Affairs at the Ludovika University. As he emphasized, the Ludovika University of Public Service is committed to fostering cooperation, including maintaining an extensive network of transatlantic partnerships. Faculty members, researchers, and students alike are engaged in seeking both scholarly and practical responses to contemporary global challenges.
Vice-Rector Pigozzi provided an overview of various initiatives aimed at internationalization, including the Ludovika Scholars Program and Ludovika Fellowship Program, along with associated scholarship opportunities. He highlighted the importance of cooperation between civil society and the academic sphere as a matter of national interest—an endeavor to which the university contributes proudly through its overseas connections.
The Inevitable
The first panel of the conference, titled Key Challenges in Transatlantic Relations, was moderated by Balázs Tárnok, Director for Research at the John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics. The keynote address was delivered by Professor Michael C. Desch, Director of the Notre Dame International Security Center at the University of Notre Dame.
Professor Desch began by recalling how and when he first encountered the work of John Lukacs. He then turned to a classical point of reference: Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War, drawing parallels between the rise and fall of ancient Athens and the contemporary global geopolitical landscape. According to Desch, two fundamental constants have persisted throughout history: the centrality of power and its distribution, and the enduring nature of human behavior.
He quoted Harvard professor Graham Allison’s interpretation of a core insight from Thucydides’ work: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta.” Based on this, Allison concluded that when a rising power (e.g., China) challenges an established hegemon (e.g., the United States), the likelihood of conflict significantly increases. Professor Desch also discussed how Thucydides is often regarded as a forerunner of realist thought in international relations theory. Realism posits that the primary drivers of international politics are power dynamics, the pursuit of power, and the inherently anarchic nature of the international system.
Demonstrating Power
The next speaker was Anna Molnár, Head of the Department of International Security Studies at the Faculty of Military Science and Officer Training at the Ludovika University of Public Service. Referring to the European Union as a postmodern entity, she emphasized that transatlantic relations have been key pillars in shaping the post–Cold War order. She discussed the EU’s common foreign and security policy initiatives, noting that certain deadlines associated with these efforts have now expired. Russia’s aggression has brought renewed urgency to the topic, she noted, and following the adoption of the Strategic Compass, the EU has now released its White Paper on the Future of European Defense. While the EU is traditionally considered a non-conventional power, Molnár argued that the time has come for it to be capable of projecting strength as well.
Christopher P. Ball, Professor of Economics at Quinnipiac University, Director of the Central European Institute, and Chair of the István Széchenyi Program, began by highlighting the significance of transatlantic trade and economic relations, presenting relevant data to underscore his points. He then turned to the recent shifts in U.S. trade policy, stressing that its impacts are increasingly felt by both workers and consumers. Addressing the question of why the Trump administration’s trade measures affected even longstanding U.S. allies, he outlined the former president’s worldview: after World War II, the U.S. helped rebuild Europe and Japan, but, in Trump’s view, was later taken advantage of. Trump also saw international organizations as inherently biased against the United States. Professor Ball suggested that these perceptions now drive efforts to reset those dynamics, and he expressed confidence that the European Union is capable of adapting to this changing environment.
Viktor Eszterhai, Head of the China and Indo-Pacific Research Program at the John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics, addressed evolving views on China. During the Biden administration, shared values and multilateral solutions were emphasized—at least rhetorically—but now, China is increasingly seen primarily as a competitor. This shift raises difficult questions: Do the EU and the U.S. truly share the same strategic interests? Should the EU always prioritize alignment with the U.S.? And is China genuinely undermining the international system, particularly when the U.S. itself has questioned longstanding trade agreements with partners like Canada?
Has Democracy Triumphed?
“Is this issue still relevant today, or are we simply trapped in Cold War reflexes when discussing the challenges of Central Europe?” This was the opening question posed by Matthew Boyse, Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute’s Center for Europe and Eurasia, in his keynote address during the panel on Geopolitical Competition in Central Europe. He argued that growing tensions in the region are increasingly evident. While those living in Central Europe are intimately familiar with these dynamics, he suggested that hearing the American perspective might also offer valuable insights.
Boyse proposed that the conversation should begin with the collapse of the Soviet Union—a moment many viewed as the final triumph of democracy and free markets in the region. The prevailing belief was that nations would be so engrossed in economic development that war would become unthinkable. Yet, the post-communist transition proved far more difficult than expected. Russia, in particular, drifted toward nationalism during its transformation, launching wars against its neighbors and seeking once again to reassert itself as an empire. Despite these developments, Europe continued to maintain economic ties with Russia, and even after the annexation of Crimea and the occupation of Eastern Ukraine, the United States offered only limited responses—until open war broke out. According to Boyse, the Kremlin has not abandoned its ambitions to exert influence over the countries of Central Europe.
A Platform for Contestation
At the same time, China has also begun to show a growing interest in the Central European region—albeit in a markedly different manner from Russia. In China’s case, the emphasis has been on expanding influence through economic investments, which tends to appear less direct or overtly personal than Moscow’s methods. Although Central Europe once made a definitive choice to align with the West, this decision no longer seems as permanent as it once did. While the EU and NATO provide frameworks for economic and security cooperation, they do not automatically shield the region from the rising influence of external powers. Both Russia and China have used this region as a platform from which to exert leverage—potentially even to challenge the West.
Regular democratic elections present especially attractive opportunities for such interference. Russia, in particular, has developed a sophisticated toolkit in this area, ranging from propaganda spread via social media, to the manipulation of migration, cyberattacks, and even terrorist activities.
In this context, Matthew Boyse also referenced recent critiques made by U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance, who has characterized the “woke agenda,” as well as debates over free speech and migration, as more pressing internal threats to Europe than Russian influence itself.
Energy Sovereignty in Question
Following the keynote lecture, a panel discussion was moderated by Gábor Csizmazia, Research Fellow at the John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics, and Head of its Americas Research Program. Panelists included Matthew Boyse; Liliana Śmiech, Director General for International Affairs at the Ludovika University of Public Service; Viktor Buzna, Senior Research Fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs; and Krisztián Jójárt, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Swedish Defense University.
Liliana Śmiech began her remarks by stating, “At present, I see no signs of confrontation with China—our economies are deeply interdependent.” She emphasized that what the West often fails to understand is that in our region, energy policy is fundamentally a matter of sovereignty. This sovereignty is not only threatened by dependence on Russian resources, but also by the EU’s green transition. Director General Śmiech argued that it is essential for European leaders to recognize that uniform solutions do not fit all member states. Greater diversification is urgently needed; total dependence—whether on China, Russia, or the United States—can weaken any actor in the region. Therefore, maintaining open and reciprocal dialogue remains essential.
With Us, Not Without Us
Viktor Buzna noted that shifts in U.S. foreign policy may bring about significant change in the region. During a potential second Trump presidency, China appears poised to renew its focus on Central Europe. The country is planning numerous trade exhibitions and conferences in the region this year, which will provide insights into how European states respond to Beijing’s overtures. Buzna stressed that one clearly unwise path would be to allow great powers to compete over the region without involving its nations directly. Instead, Central European states should aim to maintain good relations with all major actors and leverage bilateral dialogue to their advantage.
What Is Russia’s Perspective?
Krisztián Jójárt pointed out that although a ceasefire could alleviate human suffering at the front, the war itself is likely to persist, continuing to affect the daily lives of Central Europeans. From the standpoint of Russian strategic thinking, the current conflict is ultimately a war against the West. The Kremlin believes that U.S. global power has weakened, and that—through an alliance with China and the Global South—Russia could eventually emerge as the dominant global force.
However, the war has prompted significant Western responses. Germany has begun to rearm, as have NATO countries located near Russia’s borders. Jójárt noted that Russia’s current strategy is to keep its conflict with the West below the threshold of direct armed confrontation, using propaganda, disinformation, and cyberattacks as tools of influence. According to this worldview, the problem was not starting the war—but rather failing to start it early enough. If the U.S. were to withdraw from NATO or reduce its commitment, Jójárt warned, the consequences for Europe could be severe.
Subtle Differences
“The question is not whether we should trade with China, but how,” emphasized Matthew Boyse. “To what extent do we allow them into our countries, our digital networks, our databases, or even our societies?” While the United States and Europe share many core values and strategic interests, Boyse pointed out that these are not entirely identical. He reminded attendees that such subtle differences have, both in the past and now, occasionally led to temporary tensions or divergence within the transatlantic alliance.
Text: Lilla Kovács - Tibor Sarnyai (ludovika.hu)
English translation: John Lukacs Institute for Strategy and Politics
Photo: Dénes Szilágyi